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FOOTING THE BILL FOR A SOUND BASIC
EDUCATION IN NEW YORK CITY: THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL
EQUITY V. STATE ∗
Bonnie A. Scherer
“In whatever way a man sets out in his education, such accordingly will
be its consequences.” 1

INTRODUCTION
A democratic society has a vested interest in a well educated populous.
Educated citizens are capable of forming a productive workforce and
actively participating in the electoral process. 2 Individuals without a high
school diploma are significantly less likely to find meaningful employment
and lead economically stable lives in today’s economy. 3 Most states, in
order to promote an educated citizenry, provide for some form of adequate
education under their respective state constitutions. The New York State
Constitution dictates that “[t]he Legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools wherein all
the children of this state may be educated.”4
On March 16, 2005, in what appeared to be a victory for the children of
New York City, the Court of Appeals of New York, applying the Education
Article, upheld a lower court decision and recommendation, by a panel of
judicially appointed Special Referees, holding that the New York State

∗

B.S., Boston University, 2003; J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2006.
I would like to thank my family, friends, and Aaron for their unwavering support and
patience.
1. Plato, The Republic, in THE WORKS OF PLATO 1, 136 (Henry Davis M.A.
trans.,Tudor Publishing Company 1933).
2. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 484-85 (Sup. Ct.
2001).
3. Id. at 487.
4. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
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school funding system failed to provide New York City children with a
“sound basic education.” 5 The Court of Appeals mandated that the State
Legislature phase in $5.6 billion annually, as well as an additional $9.2
billion in a capital fund to reform the City public schools.6 The opinion,
however, failed to address one key question: where will the money come
from? Members of the State government, including Governor George
Pataki, indicate that New York City should be responsible for forty percent
of the bill. 7 Local officials, such as Mayor Michael Bloomberg, insist that
providing a sound basic education is the responsibility of state government,
that the State should pay for the entire amount, and that any effort by the
City to contribute will result in the loss of other programs that support
children, as well as public safety. 8 The only guidance provided by an
otherwise activist court was that the City may be responsible for a
reasonable portion of education-related expenses and that the State may not
overburden the City to the point where it cannot provide the funds. 9
Part I of this Comment will first demonstrate various approaches in
narrowing the achievement gap between wealthy and poor students under
federal and state constitutional schemes over the past fifty years. Part I will
further delineate the relative successes and failures in implementing
education finance reform in various states. Lastly, Part I will explore the
unique education system in New York City and education finance reform
in New York State over the last few decades, focusing on the multiple
judicial proceedings in Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State.
Part II will detail conflicting opinions on how and by whom a sound
basic education for the children of New York City shall be funded under
the mandate of Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State. Part II will
further explore the argument that the judiciary lacked the authority to
delegate $5.6 billion to provide a sound basic education. Part III will show
how extreme solutions are unlikely to survive the political process and how
the Court of Appeals’ most recent decision in Campaign for Fiscal Equity,
Inc. v. State leaves the door open for potentially endless litigation without
timely benefit for the children in the New York City Public School System.
Part III will also demonstrate how public engagement on where sound basic
5. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, No. 111070/93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 16,
2005), available at http://www.cfequity.org/compliance/degrassefinalorder031505.pdf.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Michael Cooper & David M. Herszenhorn, It’s Time to Pay the School Bill, But No
One’s Volunteering, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2004, at B4.
8. Id.
9. Report and Recommendations of the Judicial Referees at § IV, ¶ 87, Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, No. 111070/93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 2004), available at
http://www.cfequity.org/compliance/RefereesFinalReport11.30.04.pdf.
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education funds should come from and additional educational reforms, in
addition to increased funding, are needed to ensure that the New York City
schools provide constitutionally mandated sound basic education to its
students.
PART I: PROVIDING AN ADEQUATE EDUCATION FOR ALL
CHILDREN:
THE COMPLEX HISTORY OF EDUCATION FINANCE REFORM
LITIGATION IN NEW YORK AND ACROSS THE UNITED
STATES
In order to understand the current state of school finance, it is necessary
to first look at the history of education finance reform litigation over the
last fifty years. In Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, the Supreme
Court held that if government chooses to take on the job of educating its
citizenry it must do so equally, or not at all. 10 Brown was only the first of
many cases brought to promote education reform, a trend that continues
today, over half a century later. 11 First, individuals attempted to bring
federal equity claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 When this
approach failed, plaintiffs seeking education reform brought similar cases
under state constitutions and using equal protection arguments. 13 The
current wave of education reform cases seek to challenge whether states are
providing an adequate education to all students, as guaranteed by the
education articles of many state constitutions. 14
A. Federal Equity Claims
Immediately following Brown, in the 1960’s and early 1970’s, advocates
of education finance reform brought cases under the Fourteenth
Amendment utilizing a theory of fiscal neutrality. 15 Advocates argued that

10. See 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
11. See Sara S. Erving, New York’s Education Finance Litigation and the Title VI Wave:
An Analysis of Campaign for Fiscal Equality v. State, 10 J.L. & POL’Y 271, 279-82 (2001)
(observing that Brown was the first of three waves of education finance reform).
12. See Damian V. Gosheff, Comment, Brown’s Unfulfilled Promise: Education
Finance Reform and the Separate But Equal Effect of State Education Clause Remedies:
New York as a Model, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 889, 890 (2004).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 891 (citing William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of
School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597,
600 (1994)).
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equalizing educational spending would in turn equalize educational
opportunities for all children, a right guaranteed under the Equal Protection
Clause. 16 Though the fiscal neutrality theory had early judicial support, the
Supreme Court eventually struck down the argument that educational
equality is a federally guaranteed right under the Fourteenth Amendment,
ending the federal equity wave. 17
The first case to address education finance reform under the federal
Equal Protection Clause was Serrano v. Priest, in which the California
Supreme Court declared that a funding scheme based on wealth of districts
violated the Equal Protection Clause.18 In the wake of Priest, several other
states faced similar suits under the Equal Protection Clause framework.19
The success of Priest, however, was short-lived. The United States
Supreme Court, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
put an end to federal education funding litigation. 20
Rodriguez addressed disparities in educational opportunities for low
income students. 21 The Court, in analyzing the Texas system, held that
education was not a fundamental right and, as such, was not entitled to
heightened protection under the Equal Protection Clause. 22 Using a
deferential scrutiny analysis, the Court stated that Texas’ tax-based system
was rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose, and thus did
not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment. 23 The Court noted that issues

16. See id. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no
state may deny any citizen equal protection under the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 4 (1973).
18. 487 P.2d 1241, 1255 (Cal. 1971). The Priest court, using a fiscal neutrality analysis,
stated that California should base school funding on the wealth of the state as a whole,
rather than the wealth of individual localities to ensure equality. Id.; see also Gosheff, supra
note 12, at 891 (citing Betsy Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation: A
Commentary, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1099, 1101 (1977)).
19. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 891. Following the decision in Priest, similar suits
were immediately filed in two-thirds of the states. Id.
20. Id.; see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24.
21. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1.
22. See id. at 40. All equal protection cases ask whether there is a sufficient purpose to
justify a particular classification. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, used for discrimination
based on race or national origin, the government must show that the means is “necessary to
achieve a compelling purpose.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES § 9.1.2 (2d ed. 2002). Under heightened, or intermediate scrutiny, the
government must show that a law is substantially related to achieving an important
governmental purpose. Under a rational basis test, or deferential scrutiny, the government
only needs to show that a law is rationally related to achieving a legitimate government
purpose. This is the easiest burden to bear, and laws are rarely invalidated under the rational
basis test. Id.
23. Id. The Court noted that there may be an equal protection issue if the children in
poor districts were deprived of an education, but such was not the case. See Gosheff, supra
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of school finance and state and local property taxes were beyond the scope
of federal authority. 24 The Court’s analysis ended federal claims based on
unequal educational funding. 25
B. State Equity Claims
After Rodriguez, advocates for equal educational financing were forced
to look beyond the federal law. 26 Seeking relief under a different statutory
scheme, plaintiffs brought substantially similar education finance claims
under state constitutions.27 Initially, defining education as a fundamental
right under state constitution frameworks, rather than federal law, seemed
to yield enhanced potential for education reform. 28 But courts have
interpreted state equity claims with varying results.29
Within a decade of Rodriguez, courts became increasingly reluctant to
sustain state equity claims, 30 requiring plaintiffs to meet one of two
standards in order to prove that a school financing scheme violated the
respective state constitution. 31 First, the plaintiff could show that wealthbased financing was discriminatory, and as such required heightened
scrutiny. 32 The courts did not want to label wealth as a suspect class,

note 12, at 891-92.
24. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40-41 (1973).
25. Avidan Y. Cover, Note, Is “Adequacy” a More “Political Question” Than
“Equality?” The Effect of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education,
11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 409 (2002).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Education is at least implicitly mentioned in nearly all state constitutions,
meeting the requirement that a right be implicitly or explicitly found in the text of the
constitution in order to be considered a fundamental right. There is no mention of education
in the U.S. Constitution. Id.; see also Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1.
29. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 892. Some states adhered closely to the federal equal
protection analyses, courts only found against the state in question if they broadly construed
the standard to include education as a fundamental right. Meanwhile, other states created
their own state-specific equal protection analyses, resulting in a wide variety of results.
Plaintiffs prevailed in Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Other
states either denied claims or refused to hear them at all. Id. at 892-93 (citing Dupree v.
Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241,
1255 (Cal. 1971), appeal after remand, 557 P.2d 929, 953 (Cal. 1976); Horton v. Meskill,
376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d
139, 152 (Tenn. 1993); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 315
(Wyo. 1980)).
30. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 892 (citing Brian J. Nickerson & Gerard M.
Deenihan, From Equity to Adequacy: The Legal Battle for Increased State Funding of Poor
School Districts in New York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1341, 1349 (2003)).
31. Id. at 893.
32. Id.
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deserving of heightened scrutiny. 33 Several state programs, including
Medicaid, used wealth, or a lack of wealth, to determine eligibility.34
Defining wealth as a suspect class would put the legality of such programs
in serious danger. 35 In the alternative, courts required plaintiffs to
demonstrate that the current system failed to pass a rational basis analysis,
a difficult burden to bear.36
Furthermore, state equity claims indicated that a redistribution of wealth
was necessary to provide an equal education to all children. 37 In other
words, the financing available to wealthier districts would have to be
lowered in order to support poorer districts. 38 Such redistribution of wealth
met furious opposition as a counter-capitalist ideal. 39
The state equity trend dissipated and education reformers were forced to
seek a third avenue to address school financing disparities: bringing actions
under the education articles of many state constitutions.
C. State Adequacy Claims under the Education Article
Currently, plaintiffs bring educational inadequacy claims under the
education articles of their respective state constitutions. 40 Virtually every
state has an education article in its constitution that guarantees some form
of free public education.41 Using the education articles, as opposed to
either state or federal equal protection clauses, shifts the focus from the
unequal funding a poorer school district receives to the question of what
such funding provides, or fails to provide, for students. 42 Thus, the theory

33. Id. (citing Quentin A. Palfrey, The State Judiciary’s Role in Fulfilling Brown’s
Promise, 8 MICH J. RACE & L. 1, 20-21 (2002)).
34. Id. at 894; see also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (holding that
rational basis review is appropriate for wealth-based classification). In Dandridge, the
Supreme Court accepted the state’s interest in allocating limited state funds for public
assistance as a rational basis to justify a cap on welfare benefits regardless of family size.
Id.
35. Gosheff, supra note 12, at 894-95.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Palfrey, supra note 33, at 18).
39. Id.
40. See Deborah Verstegen & Robert Knoeppel, Equal Education Under the Law:
School Finance Reform and the Courts, 14 J.L.& POL. 555, 558-59 (1998).
41. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art XI, § 1; see also William E.
Thro, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses in School Finance Litigation, 79
EDUC. L. REP. 19, 19 (1993) (observing that every state except Mississippi has an Education
Article).
42. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 895 (citing Nickerson & Deenihan, supra note 30, at
1355).
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indicates that while unequal funding may not be inherently
unconstitutional, disparate effects of unequal funding violate the guarantee
of the states’ respective education articles. 43
Typically, in addressing adequacy claims, a court establishes a minimum
obligation guaranteed under the education article of the particular state.
This minimum obligation serves as a “constitutional floor.” 44 The court
then looks to see if the state is meeting its minimum burden.45 If the court
determines that the state is failing to meet the standard set out in its
constitution, the court must then determine whether there is a causal link
between disparate financing and failure to meet the standard.46 Courts
have applied this analysis with varying results.
i. New Jersey and the Abbot Mandate
It took twenty-five years, ten New Jersey Supreme Court opinions, three
legislative overhauls, and a failing education system to prompt the New
Jersey Supreme Court to take drastic action to remedy their school finance
system. 47 New Jersey first tried to correct disparities in educational
financing with the Public School Education Act of 1975 (“PSEA”). 48 In
Abbott v. Burke II, the court held that the PSEA violated the New Jersey
constitution as it applied to several low income districts (hereinafter, the
“Abbott districts”). 49 The legislature, in response to Abbott II, enacted the
Quality Education Act of 1990 (“QEA”) to ensure “substantially
equivalent” per pupil expenditures and money to address specific
disadvantages. 50 Despite the legislature’s efforts the QEA never came to
realize its goals. 51

43. Id.
44. Gosheff, supra note 12, at 896.
45. Id. at 897.
46. Id.
47. See Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey’s
Experience Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 615, 620-26
(2004).
48. Id. at 620.
49. Id. at 621 (citing Abbott v. Burke (Abbott II), 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990)). The
twenty-eight Abbott districts comprised approximately twenty-five percent of New Jersey’s
public school system. See Erain Applewhite & Lesley Hirsch, Educ. Law Ctr., The Abbott
Preschool Program: Fifth Year Report on Enrollment and Budget (Oct. 2003), available at
www.edlawcenter.org/ELCPublic/Publications/PDF/PreschoolFifthYearReport.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 17, 2005).
50. Greif, supra note 47, at 621. The original QEA also included increased state aid to
the Abbott districts, a phase-out of wealthy district aid, and a reduction in state aid for
teachers’ pension plans. Id.
51. Id. at 622.
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Subject to the pressures of interest groups, New Jersey’s teacher
organizations, and suburban voters, the New Jersey Legislature chose to
replace the QEA with the Quality of Education Act of 1991 (“QEA II”), a
significantly more lenient version of the original.52 Politicians who
supported the original QEA, including Governor Jim Florio, fell victim to
the electoral process and failed to win re-election. The judiciary eventually
responded. In Abbott III the judiciary declared the QEA II unconstitutional
because it failed to ensure parity funding. The judiciary gave the
legislature a year to devise a new, constitutional funding scheme. 53
At the time of Abbott III, the legislature, which was controlled by a
Republican majority and was often persuaded by the new, highly
conservative Governor, Christine Todd Whitman, failed to comply with the
court’s mandate. 54 Instead, the legislature enacted the Comprehensive
Educational Improvement and Financing Act (“CEIFA”), which did not
provide for parity funding and focused on a model school formula rather
than inputs and outputs.55 The CEIFA failed, and the court in Abbott IV
remanded the case to the New Jersey Superior Court for a hearing to
determine the cost of funding to provide a constitutionally adequate
education to the students in the Abbott districts. 56 The Superior Court, in
Abbott V, issued a report recommending whole-school reform, full day prekindergarten, full day kindergarten, summer school, school-based health
and social services, a program of fiscal and academic accountability, and
added social security. 57 The court estimated these reforms would cost an
additional $312 million per year. 58
Implementation of the Abbott V mandate, however, came at a slower
pace than expected. This brought into question with the widely held notion
that school finance reform failed in the past because broad judicial
remedies allowed state legislatures to avoid making significant changes.59
Though Abbott implemented a specific timetable for reform, deadlines
were not met, and reforms came somewhat slower than proponents

52. Id.
53. Id. at 622-23 (citing Abbott v. Burke (Abbott III), 643 A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994)). This
process bears a striking similarity to the Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State line of cases,
under which the legislature was also given a year to correct educational inadequacies and
failed. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 100 N.Y.2d. 893, 947 (2003).
54. Greif, supra note 47, at 623 (citing Abbott v. Burke (“Abbott IV”), 693 A.2d 417,
436-37 (N.J. 1997)).
55. Id.
56. Abbott IV, 693 A.2d at 456.
57. Greif, supra note 47, at 615.
58. Abbott v. Burke (”Abbott V”), 710 A.2d 450, 515 (N.J. 1998).
59. Greif, supra note 47, at 615-16.
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expected or desired. 60
Implementation of the Abbott V mandate was slow in part because it was
met with interference both from the executive and legislative branches of
the New Jersey government, despite the court’s specific instructions.61 The
judicial remedies lacked public and political support, and were decried by
some as a grossly inappropriate expansion of the court’s powers. 62 This
resistance proved to be a key barrier to school-based reform, and changes
only began to materialize after administrative changes at the executive
level and a shift in public opinion.63
Though the judiciary detailed remedies through the Abbott V mandate, it
still entrusted a lot of general responsibility to the state legislature.64 This
proved fatal, as the executive branch, openly opposed to urban school
reform, exerted pressure on the legislature to redefine what was necessary
to provide a thorough and efficient education, in order to minimize
government spending. The election of a new governor in 2002, however,
helped change the tide of school finance reform in New Jersey. 65
The legislature, apart from executive pressure, put up its own barriers to
the implementation of the Abbott V mandate. 66 Suburban districts, which
composed a large part of New Jersey’s electorate, slowed the process
because they were not willing to pay more in taxes without seeing any
benefit in their schools.67 Furthermore, the legislature resisted the Abbott V
mandate as an unfair encroachment on their power to determine how to
spend the tax-payer’s money, especially considering the requirement that
all of the money come from state funding, rather than local contributions.68
Lastly, the Abbott V mandate faced logistical difficulties and a changing

60. Id. at 626.
61. Id. at 628.
62. Id. at 628-43.
63. Id. at 638, 640-41.
64. Id. at 629-30.
65. Id. New Jersey elected James McGreevey as Governor in 2002. He was much more
receptive to education reform than his predecessor. Id. at 638-40.
66. Id. at 639-40.
67. Id. As Senator Joseph Palaia noted, “[T]alking about thirty Abbott districts as
opposed to [616] school districts in the state of New Jersey, so you know that others aren’t
going to be thrilled that the biggest pot of all is going to the thirty districts.” Id. The
suburban districts also wanted funding for construction projects, arguing that because of a
large imbalance in state funding they also needed government help. Id. On June 5, 2000
both houses of the New Jersey legislature agreed the non-Abbott districts would receive a
minimum of forty percent funding to cover their construction and facilities needs. Id. (citing
Randy Diamond, Legislature Far Apart on School Funding, BERGEN REC., Mar. 9, 2000, at
A3).
68. See Greif, supra note 47, at 642.
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economy that hindered reform. 69
Though implementation of the Abbott V mandate was slower than
expected, it was not necessarily a failure. School reform continues to be a
major issue in New Jersey, and campaigns to improve public opinion on
urban school funding give hope to meaningful reform. 70
ii. Judicial Activism and Failure in West Virginia
The story of school finance reform in West Virginia differs somewhat
from New Jersey in that it began in a small rural district rather than a large
urban system. 71 Like the children in New Jersey, the children in West
Virginia were not receiving their constitutionally guaranteed education
under the education article. 72 Following several rounds of litigation, in an
unusual display of judicial activism, the judiciary in West Virginia declared
the school finance system unconstitutional and mandated very specific
reforms. 73 In a supplemental opinion by Judge Recht, the court provided
extremely detailed remedies, including such detail as how many rooms in a
school should be designated for art classes. 74
The reforms in West Virginia were by and large unsuccessful and failed
to benefit the children. Two decades after Judge Recht’s supplemental
opinion, change was still stagnant and costs were upwards of $1.2 billion.75
The reforms came at a difficult time in the State’s economy and the
government needed to cut spending. 76 The courts, however, blocked any

69. Id. at 643-52.
70. Id. at 656.
71. See Jonathan R. Werner, Note, No Knight in Shining Armor: Why Courts Alone,
Absent Public Engagement, Could Not Achieve Successful Public School Finance Reform in
West Virginia, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 61, 61 (2002).
72. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 877 (W. Va. 1979); see also Pauley v. Bailey, No.
75-1268 (Kanawha Co. Cir., W. Va., May 11, 1982) (outlining Judge Recht’s plan for
judicial overhaul of the education system set forth on remand to the trial court); Werner,
supra note 71, at 68-72.
73. See Werner, supra note 71, at 71. Judge Recht’s plan, entitled Components of a
Thorough and Efficient System of Free Schools Within Specific Educational Offerings, listed
details such as one-hundred minutes per week of art education, with one art room for every
350-400 students, measuring at least sixty-five square feet of work area per pupil. This
level of specificity permeated the entire decision. Pauley v. Bailey, No. 75-1268 (Kanawha
Co. Cir., W.Va., May 11, 1982).
74. Pauley v. Bailey, No. 75-1268 (Kanawha Co. Cir., W. Va., May 11, 1982).
75. See Werner, supra note 71, at 73-74, 76. Judge Recht issued a supplemental opinion
shortly after the decision, in part to calm public opinion, stating that the court did not have
the power to demand that the legislature adopt his plan under the separation of powers
doctrine. Pauley v. Bailey, No. 75-1268 (Kanawha Co. Cir., W. Va., May 11, 1982).
76. See Werner, supra note 71, at 68 (citing Richard Meckley, Court Grants Education
a Preferred Funding Status in West Virginia, 7 J. EDUC. FIN. 227 (1981)).
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cuts in education spending, creating a rift between the branches of the
government. 77 The public was split between those that hailed the court’s
opinion as a victory for children, and those that felt it was an
unconstitutional act of judicial activism. 78 Such polarity was pervasive
throughout the public and the government, and prevented any actual reform
from materializing. 79 The different branches of government fought one
another’s efforts at every step, using the checks and balances process to
prevent funding changes and educational reform measures from taking
effect. 80
iii. Kentucky as a Model of Success
While judiciary-imposed reform in New Jersey and West Virginia met
significant resistance from the executive and legislative branches as well as
the public, in Kentucky, public engagement, prior to the implementation of
reform, ensured a more successful result. 81
As was the case in other states, legislative results did not come fast
enough in Kentucky and a coalition of poor districts brought suit against
the state for failing to provide a constitutionally guaranteed education.82
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Rose v. Council for Better Education,
Inc., declared the entire education system in Kentucky unconstitutional.83
In response to this decision, the legislature quickly enacted the Kentucky
Education Reform Act (KERA) which changed how the school system was
governed and financed. 84 Under KERA, Kentucky raised approximately
$1.6 billion for school finance in two years.85
KERA’s success was largely attributable to a grass-roots campaign
which laid the foundation for reform before the legislation was actually
introduced. 86 The Prichard Committee, which consisted of parents,
77. Id. (citing Meckley, supra note 76).
78. Werner, supra note 71, at 72.
79. See generally Werner, supra note 71.
80. Id.
81. See generally Jacob E. Adams, Jr., School Finance Policy and Students’
Opportunities to Learn: Kentucky’s Experience, 7 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 79 (1997),
available at http://www.futureofchildren.org/usr_doc/vol7no3ART6.pdf.
82. See Werner, supra note 71, at 65.
83. Id. (citing Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989)).
84. Werner, supra note 71, at 66.
85. See Adams, supra note 81, at 81-82.
86. Werner, supra note 71, at 66. The Prichard Committee was a reflection of support
throughout Kentucky. Furthermore, business leaders agreed to contribute financially and to
pay higher taxes if the legislature substantially changed the school system. Public support
for increased taxes to improve the education system also helped to lay the foundation for
successful reform. Furthermore, the state’s largest education union, the Kentucky Education
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politicians, local media outlets, and business leaders, rallied support for
substantial changes to the school system. 87 By 1993, KERA reduced the
relationship between a school district’s wealth and the amount of revenue
its students received by fifty-five percent, allowing for greater equity
throughout the system. 88 Over the next decade, Kentucky continued to
reduce funding disparities between poor and wealthy districts.89
Kentucky’s reform initiative did not come without opposition.
Researchers identified five significant challenges to Kentucky’s reform
initiative:
(1) to create capacity at all levels of the education system,
(2) to implement the various components of reform in a reasonable
sequence,
(3) to avoid recreating a stifling top-down bureaucracy,
(4) to foster the public and professional support needed to change over
time, and,
(5) to develop mechanisms for continuous learning and adaptation. 90

Though Kentucky was successful in increasing revenue and decreasing
disparities in its districts, the percentage of total spending allocated to
instruction actually decreased from approximately seventy-two percent to
seventy percent. 91 This slowed the actual progress of new finance
structures, but progress is ongoing and Kentucky stands as a model of
success from which other states can learn and improve upon.92 The failure
to change allocations in Kentucky is important to consider when
implementing reform in New York. 93

Association also supported reform. All collaborative efforts occurred before the case was
even filed in the lower court. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Adams, supra note 81, at 81-85.
90. Id. at 91.
91. Id. at 82. After reform, Kentucky’s spending patterns changed less than one percent
with respect to administration, student services, transportation, operations, maintenance,
fixed costs, and debt service. Id.
92. See Werner, supra note 71, at 63.
93. See Raymond Domanico, No Strings Attached? Ensuring that “CFE” Funds are
Spent Effectively, MANHATTAN INST. CIVIC REPORT NO. 42 (July 2004), available at
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cr_42.htm. Between 1982 and 2002 the total
revenues in New York nearly tripled, and the state’s share of funding in New York City
increased. Increased funding alone, however, did not translate into improved schools. Id.
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D. The New York State Aid System and the Unique Character of the
New York City Public Schools
New York uses a state aid formula to “equalize” state educational
opportunity. 94 The theory of the state aid formula is to ensure that all
students receive the highest minimum possible with the available resources,
without stunting the growth of communities that wish to contribute above
the minimum. 95 The state provides a base amount to all districts that is less
than what is required to educate a child. 96 State operating aid is then
distributed on a formula based on property and income. 97 Then the State
computes Extraordinary Needs Aid, which assists children in districts with
condensed poverty or low achievement levels. Extraordinary Needs Aid
includes: (1) a fund for special education, (2) per capita funding for
textbooks and other instrumentalities, and, (3) aid for transportation and
building. 98 For the upcoming 2005-06 school year, the state will give New
York City approximately $5.6 billion dollars in aid (an amount determined
by the aforementioned formula), and an additional $140 million in special
grant programs. 99
Generally, New York City receives approximately thirty-nine percent of
any operating aid increase from the State, otherwise known as the “state
share.” 100 Regardless of state share, no district receives less than they did
the year before, due to the “save harmless” provisions which guarantee
districts with declining enrollment or changing wealth the same funding as
the previous year. 101 Even the wealthiest districts receive some form of
state aid. 102
There are several additional factors that lead to funding considerations in
New York City. The New York City schools have revenues of $12 billion,
which equals allowing $11,165 per student. 103 This is significantly less

94. See Kent K. Anker, Differences and Dialogue: School Finance in New York State,
24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 345, 356 (1998).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. EDUC. UNIT, N.Y. STATE DIV. OF THE BUDGET, DESCRIPTION OF 2005-06 NEW YORK
STATE EXECUTIVE BUDGET RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY
EDUCATION 30 (2005) [hereinafter EDUCATION UNIT].
98. Anker, supra note 94, at 356.
99. EDUCATION UNIT, supra note 97, at 30.
100. Anker, supra note 94, at 358.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. CITIZENS BUDGET COMM’N, CAN NEW YORK GET AN A IN SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM?
4-6 (Nov. 2004), at http://www.cbcny.org/CBC_School_Finance_Reform_11-04.pdf
[hereinafter CBC REPORT].
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than the state school revenues of $35 billion, or $12,770 per student.104
The federal government contributes less than ten percent of the funding for
the New York City school system; the State contributes approximately 55.5
percent, and the rest comes from local funding sources, including property
taxes. 105 The tax effort in New York City, however, is lower than the
statewide average. 106 New York State requires localities to contribute to
payment for Medicaid, a high figure in New York City, which, coupled
with the local tax effort, brings the City well above the statewide
average. 107
Moreover, children in New York City attend the largest school system in
the country, which serves a population of 1.1 million students, in
approximately 1,100 schools. 108 Over half of these schools are over fiftyfive years old, and thirty-eight percent require substantial improvements. 109
The composure of the student body adds further to the uniqueness of the
system. 110 There are 180 languages spoken amongst the children of New
York City, and one in every eleven students is a recent immigrant.111
Approximately seventy-three percent of New York State’s total minority
student body attends a New York City public school. 112 Additionally,
sixteen percent of City children are classified as having limited English
proficiency, meaning that they scored below the fortieth percentile on
language assessment tests. 113 Nearly half of the students come from
families receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and seventythree percent of students get free lunch, as compared to five percent in the
rest of the State.114 Fifty-two percent of students in the City attend schools
in which more than forty percent of their peers are poor, as compared with
eleven percent of students outside of the Big Five Cities (Buffalo, New
York, Rochester, Syracuse, and Yonkers). 115
104. Id.
105. Id. The low federal contribution comes from the nation’s historic reliance on local
control of schools and the absence of a public education role for the federal government in
the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 10 FACTS ABOUT K-12 EDUCATION FINDING,
(2005), at http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/index.html.
106. CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 4-6.
107. Id. New York City’s combined school and Medicaid tax effort significantly exceeds
the statewide average: $16.70 per $1,000 versus $14.40 per $1,000. Id.
108. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 488 (Sup. Ct. 2001).
109. Id. at 505.
110. Id. at 489-90.
111. Id. at 490.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. School lunch is an indicator of low income. Id.
115. See Anker, supra note 94, at 350.
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Students in the City are also at a disadvantage with respect to teachers.
Approximately ten-to-fourteen percent of teachers in New York City are
not certified, as compared to the state average of four percent.116 The
concentration of uncertified and inexperienced teachers is
Facilities and
disproportionately high in poorer districts.117
instrumentalities are also potential barriers to adequate education.
Textbooks are frequently out of date, libraries insufficient, and access to
computers limited. 118 Lastly, class sizes in New York City are especially
large. 119 As a result, teacher attention on each child is notably limited. 120
From an output perspective, only half of New York City ninth grade
students graduate in four years. 121 Thirty percent of ninth graders never
graduate at all, nor do they get their general equivalency diploma
(G.E.D.) 122 Out of the students that do graduate and go on to the City
University of New York, eighty percent require remedial help in one or
more major subjects, with approximately half of those students requiring
help in multiple subjects.123
New York City children attend school in dilapidated buildings and are
issued out-of-date textbooks and taught by inexperienced teachers, making
it difficult to graduate.124 This flawed system affects students’ abilities to
gain an adequate education. 125
E. New York’s Road to Adequacy in Education
In February 2005, the Court of Appeals declared the New York school
funding system, as it applies to New York City, invalid under the
Education Article. 126 After several stages of litigation and legislation,

116. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 899-900.
117. See Domanico, supra note 93. Teachers in New York City schools with high
minority enrollments are on average less experienced and lower paid than teachers in
schools with low minority enrollments. Id. This is unique to the New York City schools.
Much of this allocation stems from the teachers’ contract, which states that vacant positions
must be “filled by the most senior qualified applicant.” Id. The senior applicants tend to
gravitate towards higher achieving districts in wealthier areas. Id.
118. Anker, supra note 94, at 352.
119. Id. at 351.
120. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 901-02.
121. Id. at 902. “Only 50% of New York City Public School students who entered ninth
grade in 1996, and who stayed in school, made it to twelfth grade in four years.” Id. at n.
134.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 909-15 (2003).
126. Gosheff, supra note 12, at 897-98.
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Justice DeGrasse of the Supreme Court of New York, in Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State of New York (“CFE V”), declared that an annual
increase of $5.6 billion is necessary to provide the children of the New
York City public schools with the education guaranteed by the New York
Constitution. 127
New York’s road to CFE V followed the national trend. 128 In Levittown
Union Free School District v. Nyquist, the court struck down both federal
and state equity claims. 129 The court indicated that the Education Article
only guaranteed a “sound basic education”, and absent a “gross and glaring
inadequacy” they would refrain from declaring a system invalid. 130
R.E.F.I.T. v. Cuomo used the “sound basic education” language provided
in Levittown, claiming that New York failed to provide a sound basic
education under the Education Article because of unequal funding for
minority students. 131 The plaintiffs in R.E.F.I.T. failed because they
brought an equity claim, already determined to be invalid under Levittown,
and attempted to disguise it as an adequacy issue. 132 The court did not take
the opportunity to rule on adequacy in R.E.F.I.T., leaving the door open for
the Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State line of cases.
F. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State: Adequacy in the New York
City Public School System.
The plaintiffs, in Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, noting, the
mistake in R.E.F.I.T., brought two separate causes of action. 133 First, they
claimed that the state violated the Education Article by utilizing a funding
system which failed to provide a sound basic education to New York City
students. 134 Second, the Campaign for Fiscal Equity asserted that New
York State’s method of financing the schools violated Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 because of the disparate impact that the funding system
has on minority students. 135 The New York State Constitution ensures that
“[t]he Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
127. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc., v. State, No. 111070/93, slip op. at 4 (N.Y.
Sup.
Ct.
Mar.
16,
2005),
at
http://www.cfequity.org/compliance/degrassefinalorder031505.pdf.
128. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 898.
129. 439 N.E.2d 359, 365 (N.Y. 1982).
130. Id. at 369.
131. Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today (R.E.F.I.T.) v. Cuomo, 606 N.Y.S.2d 44 (App.
Div. 1993), order aff’d as modified, 86 N.Y.2d 279, 283 (1995).
132. Gosheff, supra note 12, at 903.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may
be educated.” 136 As interpreted in Levittown, this clause guarantees a
sound basic education. 137
In 1995 the Court of Appeals, in the first Campaign for Fiscal Equity
(“CFE”) case, set up a template to guide the district court in determining if
the State violated its duty to provide a sound basic education to all children,
and remanded the case.138 The template defined a sound basic education as
“the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable
children to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of
voting and serving on a jury.” 139 The district court was inherited with the
task of evaluating inputs and outputs to see if the New York City schools
met the sound basic education standard.140 The inputs required were:
(1) “[M]inimally adequate teaching of reasonably up-to-date basic
curricula such as reading, writing, mathematics, science, and social
studies, by sufficient personnel adequately trained to teach those subject
areas.” 141
(2) “[M]inimally adequate physical facilities and classrooms which
provide enough light, space, heat, and air to permit children to learn.” 142
(3) “[M]inimally adequate instrumentalities of learning such as desks,
chairs, pencils, and reasonably current textbooks.” 143

The Campaign for Fiscal Equity assisted in defining a sound basic
education through a collaborative effort which utilized community forums
that brought together urban, rural and suburban residents, policy makers,
and school officials. 144 As a result of these forums, the CFE helped the
court define the inputs necessary to provide a sound basic education, and
determined that employment was an important goal of education.145
Based on the inputs determined by the court, with the help of CFE and
additional output information which included test scores and graduation
rates, the district court determined that New York’s school funding system
failed to provide the students of New York City with a sound basic
136. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
137. Bd. of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 48 (1982).
138. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 317 (1995) [hereinafter
CFE I].
139. Id. at 316.
140. Id. at 317.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Michael A. Rebell, Adequacy Litigations: A New Path to Equity, in BRINGING
EQUITY BACK 28-35 (Janice Petrovich and Amy Stuart Wells eds., 2004).
145. Id. at 31.
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education. 146 The district court indicated that a sound basic education must
provide not only the skills necessary to vote and serve on a jury, but also to
obtain substantive employment, and that City students were not provided
with these skills. 147 Furthermore, the court found a causal link between the
funding of the schools and the deficiencies in the system by showing that
the schools would improve if the State provided additional funding. 148
The Appellate Division in CFE III overturned the lower court’s ruling
and held that the Education Article requires only a “minimally adequate
educational opportunity.” 149 The Appellate Division further stated that the
standards used by the trial court were too high to meet this minimal
standard, and that the state funding system satisfied the constitutional
minimum. 150 The CFE III court indicated that although education must
take the future employment opportunities of students into account, it can
only be mandated to the extent that students are able to live independently
of public assistance, which they were at present. 151 Moreover, the court
stated that the facilities, instrumentalities, and teaching in the city system
also satisfied the constitutional floor. 152 The court noted that, had it found
inadequacies in the system, the plaintiffs still failed to demonstrate a causal
link between any such inadequacy and school funding. 153 The correct test
of causation, according to the Appellate Division, was whether the current
system deprived students of the opportunity to get a sound basic education,
and not whether more money would help in attaining that goal.154
In 2003, the Court of Appeals took on the task of deciding whether the
trial court or the intermediate court determined the correct standard and

146. Id. at 32-37.
147. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475, 485 (Sup. Ct. 2001)
[hereinafter CFE II]. The CFE II court further indicated that a high school level of
education was necessary in order to complete civic duties and obtain employment.
148. Id. at 520.
149. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 744 N.Y.S.2d 130, 134 (App. Div. 2002)
[hereinafter CFE III].
150. Id.
151. Id. at 138-39. The court noted that an eighth-grade education was sufficient to
achieve the goal of civic participation. The State submitted evidence that understanding
jury charges requires a grade level of 8.3, and understanding newspaper articles on
campaign and ballot issues requires a grade level ranging from 6.5 to 11.7. Plaintiffs’ expert
disagreed, but did not specify the level needed to complete these tasks. Id. at 138.
152. Id. at 140-43.
153. Id. at 138-39.
154. Id. at 135-39. The court further concluded that the problem was not a lack of
sufficient opportunity to obtain a sound basic education, but rather that the socioeconomic
problems that many students face hinder their ability to concentrate on their studies, and
more funding will not address that. Id. at 144.
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facts. 155 The Court of Appeals overturned the intermediate court and held
that the students were not getting a sound basic education under the current
funding system, pointing to the poor graduation rates as a strong
indicator. 156 The Court of Appeals noted that employment is implicitly
necessary to a productive citizenry, and that basic employment in today’s
society requires a full high school education.157
Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that, although teaching and
instrumentalities were inadequate, poor facilities did not rise to the level of
inadequacy. 158 The court found a causal link by indicating a correlation
between the present funding system and educational opportunities. 159 The
court further ordered the State to ascertain the actual cost of providing a
sound basic education in New York City and to ensure a system of
accountability. 160
Despite the order of the Court of Appeals, the State Legislature failed to
determine the cost of a sound basic education within the one year
deadline. 161 Thus, on August 3, 2004, the judiciary appointed a panel of
three Judicial Referees to recommend a remedy by November 30, 2004.162
The panel of Judicial Referees focused on what they found to be a strong
correlation between adequacy of funding and the ability of a school district
to fulfill the constitutional guarantee.163 They determined that the City
schools required a phased in, annual infusion of $5.63 billion, to fix
inadequacies and that $9 billion more was necessary in a capital funding

155. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 328-29 (N.Y. 2003)
[hereinafter CFE IV].
156. Id. at 333-37. Of New York City-ninth grade students who do not transfer, only
fifty percent graduate within four years, and thirty percent do not graduate or earn an
equivalent degree by the age of twenty-one. Id. at 336.
157. Id. at 331.
158. Id. at 333-36. In all, the court found that the inputs in the New York City public
schools are deficient in providing a sound basic education. Id. at 336.
159. Id. at 336. The court used the original definition of causation, and agreed that a
causal link is present if the plaintiffs show “that increased funding can provide better
teachers, facilities and instrumentalities of learning. . . . [T]his showing, together with
evidence that such improved inputs yield better student performance,” was sufficient to
show causation. Id. (citing Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 319
(1995)).
160. Id. at 348.
161. Report and Recommendations of the Judicial Referees at 2, Campaign for Fiscal
Equity, Inc. v. State, No. 111070/93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 2004),
http://www.cfequity.org/compliance/RefereesFinalReport11.30.04.pdf, [hereinafter Report
of the Judicial Referees].
162. Id. at 2, 7.
163. CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 6.
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plan. 164 The Judicial Referees reiterated that the State bears the “ultimate
responsibility for the conduct of its agents and the quality of education in
New York City public schools.” 165 The Referees, however, left the
question as to what extent the State could require the City to contribute to
the burden as a matter for the Legislature. 166 They warned that the
Legislature could not “thwart the implementation of this Court’s Order by
being arbitrary or unreasonable in its allocation to the City of New York of
a funding burden.” 167
Justice Leland DeGrasse approved the recommendations of the Judicial
Referees in CFE V. 168 He did not address whether the city should be
responsible in part for the burden of payment and again deferred to the
Legislature on this issue. 169
Twelve years have passed since the initial filing of CFE v. State in
1993. 170 In the coming months, the legislature will begin the task of
allocating funds for school finance reform. Time will show whether years
of litigation will result in improved education in New York City.
PART II: IMPLEMENTATION OF SCHOOL FUNDING REFORM IN NEW
YORK: WHO FOOTS THE BILL, AND IS THAT ENOUGH?
A. Introduction
For over forty years, the legislative and judicial branches of both the
federal and state governments have been looking for a means of reforming
troubled education financing systems. 171 Though recent methods for
invalidating these systems have been similar, the implementation of
educational reform has taken several different courses across the nation,
with varying results. 172
As New York begins to reform its education funding system to provide a
sound basic education to City students, it may look to the relative success
of other states’ techniques to measure its own potential success. 173 The

164. Id.
165. Report of the Judicial Referees, supra note 161, § IV ¶ 1.
166. Id. § 2, ¶ 6.
167. Id. § IV, ¶ 87.
168. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, No. 111070/93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar.16,
2005), http://www.cfequity.org/compliance/degrassefinalorder031505.pdf.
169. Id.
170. See Gosheff, supra note 12, at 904.
171. See generally Gosheff, supra note 12.
172. See supra notes 40-93 and accompanying text.
173. Id.
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difficulty of achieving successful reform is twofold. First, the legislature
must determine who will pay for the sound basic education, a hotly
contested issue. Second, the State must determine how to go about
implementing the reforms. 174
New York City is at a crossroads for education finance reform. While
CFE V indicates promise for reform, there also exists a potential for failure.
Justice DeGrasse’s opinion, as well as the opinion of the Judicial Referees,
failed to stipulate who was to pay the daunting figure of $5.6 billion per
year. 175 The only guidance they provided was that the City may be
responsible for a reasonable portion of the expenses and that the State may
not overburden the City to the point where it cannot provide the funds.176
The court did not give any indication what it considered a reasonable
amount. 177
B.

Support For a Larger Local Contribution

Members of the State government, including Governor Pataki, believe
that New York City should be responsible for a significant portion
(approximately forty percent) of the sound basic education funds. 178 These
proponents of a large local contribution point to the “maintenance of effort”
problem. Such a problem occurs when the City uses state aid to supplant
rather than supplement local funding by failing to spend as much on
education out of its own funds as it did the year before.179 Supporters of
local contribution contend that a history of maintenance of effort problems
have, at least partially, caused the degradation of the City school system,
and thus, the local government should be forced to help fix it. 180 The City
also has limited tax support for education.181
Moreover, proponents of a local contribution argue that if state aid to
education is generally increased, it will be done at the expense of other
important state programs and wealthier school districts.182 If the State
narrows the funding gap with a reallocation of state aid and/or a revision of
174. See infra notes 214-50 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
178. Michael Cooper & David M. Herszenhorn, supra note 7.
179. Anker, supra note 94, at 373. The maintenance of effort problem leads to distorted
state aid formulas. See id.
180. See id.
181. Id. (citing GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOL FINANCE: STATE EFFORTS TO REDUCE
FUNDING GAPS BETWEEN POOR AND WEALTHY DISTRICTS 233 (1997)).
182. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 343 (1995) (Simons,
J., dissenting in part).
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the state aid formula for New York City, it will be at the expense of other,
more successful school districts. Such action will force wealthier districts
to increase local taxes to make up the difference.183 Advocates of local
contribution argue that the aforementioned consequences will have an
unreasonable effect on the rest of the State, given New York City’s history
of reducing its municipal appropriations for education when provided with
additional aid. 184
Justice Simons, in his dissent in CFE I, articulated the argument for local
government contribution. 185 He noted:
Moreover, there is serious doubt that plaintiffs can establish that any
claimed deficiency in the State funding scheme has caused a deprivation
of educational opportunity to City students. These claims against the
State are presented at a time when New York City is reducing its funding
to the City School District when measured both in terms of the dollars
appropriated and the percentage of its municipal budget allocated to
education (see, Chancellor’s Budget Estimate, 1995-1996, op. cit., at 14).
And these reductions have occurred even though the City is among
municipalities having the lowest residential property tax rate for school
purposes in the State and devotes the lowest percentage of its tax revenue
to education. The Chancellor of the City School District has stated that
the City contributes approximately 20% of its revenues to education,
whereas the percentage contributed to education by other localities in the
State is almost twice as much (see, Chancellor’s Budget Estimate, 19951996, op. cit., at 14). Based upon this evidence, a court could justifiably
conclude as a matter of law that the shortcomings in the City schools are
caused by the City’s failure to adequately fund City schools, not from any
default by the State of its constitutional duty. 186

C.

Support for a Large or Total State Contribution

Local officials, such as Mayor Bloomberg and the school commissioner,
Joel Klein, insist that providing a sound basic education is the role of state
government, that the State should pay for the entire amount, and that any
effort by the City to contribute will result in the loss of other programs that
support children as well as public safety. 187 Proponents of full state

183. See id.
184. See id.
185. See id. at 341.
186. Id. But see Anker, supra note 94, at 374 (noting that the Legislature set up the
education system and that if maintenance of effort is a problem, “the Legislature should pass
a meaningful maintenance of effort law”).
187. See Cooper & Herszenhorn, supra note 7. Chancellor Joel Klein focused on one
footnote in the Report of the Judicial Referees, which noted that the city already has a high
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funding blame the state share system and the heavy Medicaid burden on the
City for causing the funding failure.188 Such arguments indicate that the
share system is flawed because it only takes into account the enrollment
figures and does not consider the disproportionately large number of
special needs children in the City. 189 They insist that a formulaic number,
which does not consider the unique factors present, cannot adequately
provide the necessary aid in a given year. 190 Proponents of full state
funding also note that the State is ultimately responsible for overseeing the
school districts and boards of education within, and thus are ultimately the
ones who must bear the fiscal responsibility. 191
To assist in the implementation of CFE V, the Citizen’s Budget
Commission (“CBC”) conducted an analysis to determine who should be
responsible for footing the bill for a sound basic education. Under the
CBC’s analysis the State should be responsible for the full $5.6 billion for
five reasons. 192 First, increased state funding is consistent with long-term
national trends that recognize the merits of greater amounts of state
funding. 193 As Justice DeGrasse and the Judicial Referees noted, sufficient
funding is directly correlated to providing a sound basic education.194
Second, New York State provides less funding as a whole to its localities
for education than other states; it provides 50.6 percent of the total cost of
education in New York City, and forty-nine percent throughout the rest of
the State. 195 Third, larger state shares of funding correlate with a lower
disparity in spending among districts. 196 New York State ranks twentyfourth in the nation in disparity between wealthy and poor districts. 197
Fourth, state taxes in New York are relatively low, while local taxes are

tax burden and will have to cut programs if it needs to spend more to support the position
that the State should contribute fully. Id. (citing Report of Judicial Referees, supra note 161,
at n.73).
188. See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 10-11 (pointing to the $4.3 billion the City paid
to the state in mandated aid for Medicaid as a reason why the City is unable to fund a sound
basic education).
189. See Anker, supra note 94, at 356-59.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 9-12.
193. Id. at 9-10.
194. See supra notes 163-69 and accompanying text.
195. See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 10. New York ranks thirty-fourth in the nation
for percentage of state aid to school districts. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. According to the CBC Report, there is a negative correlation between the degree
of disparity and the spending provided by the state, though the CBC noted that this
correlation is far from perfect, indicating that other factors may come into play as well. Id.
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171 percent higher than the national average.198 New York State requires
local governments to pay a significant share of expenses related to
Medicaid and public assistance, 199 which accounts for twenty-five percent
of the difference between New York’s local tax burden and the national
average. 200 In fiscal year 2004, New York City paid $4.3 billion in
mandated aid to the State for Medicaid, an amount that would have covered
much of the sound basic education cost. 201 The CBC further concluded
that adding to the already high local tax burden is likely to force cuts in
services other than education or force high tax increases which will harm
economic vitality in the City. 202
Fifth, the CBC explained that statewide funding is consistent with
principles of public finance and thus the State should bear the burden.203
The public finance argument states that education costs should be borne by
the broadest instrumentality possible. 204 It relies on the fact that Americans
are highly mobile, and may work anywhere in the country. 205 Furthermore,
participation in the political process spans more than local government. 206
The CBC argued that while this may make it seem as if the burden falls on
the federal government to pay for educational reform, federalism concerns
are likely to prevent an increase in federal contribution and as such the
State is the next logical choice.207
The CBC concluded that there are ways for the state to raise the funds
necessary, and that it was responsible for doing so. 208 It provided
suggestions for increased state funding which included eliminating
educational inefficiencies through reduction of misallocated aid, better use
of teacher time, consolidation of smaller districts, and a cap on
administrative expenses. 209 The CBC also suggested implementing

198. Id. at 10-11.
199. Id. at 11.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 12.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
208. See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 32.
209. Id. A uniform local tax effort involves the State setting a “target per pupil
expenditure” to provide the average student with a sound basic education. Id. The State
then sets a local tax rate “sufficient to yield a target local share of the target expenditures for
a district with an average tax base.” Id. Next, the State calculates the “mandated
expenditure requirement for each district using the average per pupil figure and adjusting for
the characteristics of students and the local cost of living.” Id. Lastly, the State makes an
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Governor Pataki’s plan to increase gambling revenues and restructure
existing taxes. 210
D.

Judicial Intervention in Education Reform: Helpful Ally or
Violation of Separation of Powers?

Though most opponents and proponents of CFE V argue over who shall
foot the bill, others, including Justice Simmons, purport that it is not the
role of the judiciary to compel any change in the state aid formula and that
such action “encroaches on the Legislature’s power to order State priorities
and allocate the State’s limited resources.”211 Supporters of this view
called for an appeal to the CFE V decision, which Governor Pataki filed.212
The State, in CFE V, cited the New York Constitution, Article VII, section
7 which provides: “No money shall ever be paid out of the State treasury
funds, or any other funds under its management, except in pursuant of an
appropriation by law. . .” to support their argument that the judiciary is
over-reaching its power in mandating that $5.6 billion dollars be
appropriated to New York City for education. 213 The Court of Appeals, in
deeming the funding system unconstitutional, held that “it is the province
of the Judicial branch to define and safeguard rights provided by the New
York State Constitution, and order redress for violation of them.” 214 Thus,
the court held that the recommendations of the Judicial Referees did not
aid payment to each district “equal to the difference between its mandated expenditure
requirement and its mandated minimum tax effort.” Id. This shifts the funding from local
property taxes to statewide revenues, and is quicker to achieve than full state funding. Id. at
8-9.
210. See id. at 32-33. The CBC Report indicated that expanded gambling could generate
approximately $2 billion annually for education, but that this increase should be restricted to
destination casinos and promoted reasonably, to avoid a negative impact on low income
citizens. The CBC Report further suggested enforcing the current sales tax on internet
transactions and other exempt items. Id.
211. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 86 N.Y.2d 307, 343 (1995) (Simons,
J., dissenting in part).
212. The decision was met with some resistence. See Letter from Anthony D. Weiner,
Charles B. Rangel, Jerrold Nadler, Major R. Owens, Jose E. Serrano, Carolyn Maloney,
Joseph Crowley, Gregory W. Meeks, and Edolphus Towns, Members of Congress, to
George Pataki, Governor, New York State (Feb. 23, 2005) (requesting that the State refrain
from appealing and work to improve the schools), available at http://www.cfequity.org/0224-05letter.htm [hereinafter Letter to Governor Pataki].
213. Motion Consolidation at 3, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, No. 111070/93
(Sup.
Ct.
N.Y.
Feb.
14,
2005),
available
at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/whatsnew/pdf/CFE-2.pdf.
214. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 925 (2003); see also,
Klosterman v. Cuomo, 61 N.Y.2d 525, 535 (2d Cir. 1984) (recognizing the distinction
“between a court’s imposition of its own policy determination upon its governmental
partners and its mere declaration and enforcement of . . . rights”).
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violate the separation of powers doctrine and the argument was inconsistent
with current law. 215
E.

Schools for New York’s Future Act

A fourth approach recently surfaced that combined the concerns of the
supporters of total state funding and supporters of a large local
contribution. On June 3, 2005, Assemblyman Steven Sanders, chairman of
the New York State Assembly’s Education Committee, introduced a bill
known as the Schools for New York’s Future Act (Future Act). 216 The
proposed bill, authored in part by the CFE, set forth a formula for state and
local contribution shares as well as accountability provisions.217 The bill,
if passed in the upcoming legislative session by the State Senate, could
bring changes to New York City school children as early as the upcoming
school year. 218
The proposed Future Act establishes a base funding level of
approximately $8000 per student for all schools in the State. 219 The
entitlement for each school district is then calculated by multiplying the
base amount by the district’s average daily membership, and in doing so,
weighting low income students, English language learners, and students
with disabilities. 220 The formula allows each student to qualify for one or
more weighting category. 221 Calculations are adjusted each year based on

215. Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893, 925-31 (2003).
216. See Press Release, Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Assemblyman Sanders Introduces
Schools for New York’s Future Act for Passage in Current Legislative Session, at
http://www.cfequity.org/06-07-05sandersbill.htm (June 7, 2005).
217. Id. The accountability provisions require all districts not meeting the eighty percent
successful school district standard, including New York City, to develop a four year
comprehensive sound basic education plan with annual updates to improve student
performance and eliminate achievement gaps. The comprehensive plan would address
needs in the quality of teaching and instructional leadership; appropriate class sizing;
adequacy of school facilities; pre-kindergarten services; services to at risk students;
instrumentalities of learning; parental involvement and responsibility; and the need for a
safe orderly learning environment. The part of the plan which dealt specifically with
teacher’s issues addressed competitive pay scales, teacher recruitment and retention,
equitable distribution of experienced teachers, and improvements of teaching quality. These
annual reports required will be made available to all members of the public in district offices
and on the internet. H.R. A8700 §1302(7), 2005-06 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
218. Id.
219. See CAMPAIGN FOR FISCAL EQUITY, MAJOR PROVISIONS: SCHOOLS FOR NEW YORK’S
FUTURE ACT, at http://www.nysecb.org/news/050323schoolsfuture02.html (Mar. 23, 2005).
220. Id.
221. Id. The total figure is then determined and multiplied by the Cost of Education
Index developed through the New York Adequacy Study and by a sparsity factor to arrive at
the Sound Basic Education amount for each district. Id.
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population, and changes to state and local contributions are adjusted
accordingly. 222
The proportion of the sound basic education funding that should be paid
by the State and by the locality are also determined by a formula under the
Future Act. 223 The figure is then adjusted to reflect poverty levels in the
district. This local contribution is expected from all districts and is
mandated for those that are not providing a sound basic education,
including New York City. The five major cities, including New York City,
and twenty other districts in New York, would be subject to the mandatory
contribution requirement for the first year.
PART III: FULFILLING THE PROMISE OF CFE V. STATE IN NEW
YORK CITY: POLITICS AND PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT
A.

Introduction

Policy is not self-executing. As history shows, school finance reform is
difficult to implement, even with laudable goals and well-intentioned
judicial action.224 Thus, triumph in a system as unique and complex as the
New York City public school system is sure to be an uphill battle.225
Successful narrowing of the achievement gap for New York City students
requires a resolution of who should pay for a sound basic education
coupled with public and political support.
While the State wants the City to contribute forty percent, City officials
believe that the State should pay the entire $5.6 billion. 226 Governor Pataki
has already expressed his plans to file an appeal, CFE V, rather than a
proposal for school funding within the ninety-day period given by the
court. 227 If CFE V returns to the appeals process, the children of New York
City will continue to be deprived of the funding the court determined as

222. Id.
223. Id. The contribution ratio is based on the average of the ratio of the district’s
property wealth per pupil to the statewide average property wealth per pupil and the ratio of
the district’s income per pupil to the statewide average income per pupil. “This
determination would be made in accordance with the definition of a successful district,
which was established by the Regents and endorsed by the court.” Id.
224. See supra notes 40-93 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 94-125 and accompanying text for a discussion of the complexities
of the New York City public schools.
226. See supra notes 178-210 and accompanying text.
227. See, e.g., Errol A. Cockfield Jr., Now, It’s a Math Problem. Legislators Haggle Over
Where to Get the Billions of Dollars Needed to Fund the City’s School System, NEWSDAY,
Feb. 16, 2005, at A4; Greg Winter, Judge Orders Billions in Aid to City Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2005, at A1.
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necessary to obtain a constitutionally guaranteed sound basic education. 228
An appeal of CFE V is unlikely to overturn the holding on separation of
powers grounds. 229 Though Governor Pataki continues to claim that the
case should be thrown out because the judiciary lacks the power to mandate
the Legislature to allocate funds for education, the prior CFE cases have
made it clear that the court has the jurisdiction to decide this case and to
mandate appropriate remedies. Therefore, any such argument is likely to
fail, and will only result in stagnation of education reform in New York
City.
B.

Grass Roots Support, Rather Than Polarity, Will Thwart
Opposition to Reform

On appeal, the only further role the courts can play is to determine the
eventual remedy and allocate the payment burden. The courts, however,
are not the appropriate forum to produce a successful result. Polar or
arbitrary answers to the payment question are unreasonable, impractical,
and unlikely to further school finance reform. If the state becomes one
hundred percent responsible for funding education, the City will be able to
shirk responsibility for having misallocated funds in years past. 230 If the
Legislature or the courts accept a full state contribution as reasonable, then
the State will be forced to reallocate funds away from successful districts,
and/or increase taxes, while the city evades responsibly for poor
management of State aid in the past. 231 An approach that takes money
from suburban citizens and gives it to poor urban districts’ citizens is likely
to meet public opposition, as it did in New Jersey. 232 Acknowledging the
concerns of suburban and wealthy district residents and appealing to their
self-interests may thwart some of this opposition.233
The State, given its constitutional obligation to provide its citizens with
a sound basic education, will be responsible for at least a portion of the
annual $5.6 billion. As such, residents outside of New York City will be at
least partly responsible for the education of the children in the urban
system. The best way to avoid suburban backlash is to show how a

228. See Letter to Governor Pataki, supra note 212 (requesting that the State refrain from
appealing and work to improve the schools).
229. Any appeal is likely to be remanded to the trial court to determine the relevant
standard of facts and eventual remedy, bringing the case to come full circle without having
brought any relief for the children of New York City. See supra note 155.
230. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 52-53, 182-86 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 52-53, 182-86 and accompanying text.
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reformed school finance system in New York can help protect and expand
interests outside of New York City. As former Governor Cuomo noted, the
wealthier districts will be hard-pressed to stand behind reforms that they
feel have no bearing on them other than to raise their taxes.234
Acknowledging the concerns of suburban and wealthy district residents
and avoiding a pure “Robin Hood” approach will appeal to residents of
these districts without threatening their own self-interests. In prior
suburban forums, discussions led the residents of such communities to
understand the plight of urban citizens, encouraging them to work towards
reform in urban areas. The significance of previous public engagement
efforts, in the earlier stages of CFE V, and the importance of continuing
this process are evident in an editorial published in an affluent suburban
county newspaper:
This “public engagement process” is an exciting one. It includes
hundreds of parents, teachers, administrators, advocates, and
representatives of civic, religious, business, and labor groups from across
the state exchanging ideas on critical issues, including how funding
reform can dovetail with state Board of Regents’ effort to raise academic
standards . . . . The plan . . . is to offer participants an opportunity to
directly influence reform positions [CFE] will present to the court. That
in itself is refreshing. After years of watching state officials . . . avoid this
admittedly difficult but vital area of reform, it’s high time the fiscal
inequalities of the education system were addressed. And the fact that the
public isn’t being bypassed is heartening. 235

Active community involvement in reform has been a major determinant
of success in education adequacy cases. 236 Advocates can improve public
opinion through collaborative effort and by continuing the community
dialogue process. Thus, the political process will dictate the result.
A large City contribution, such as the forty percent arbitrarily picked by
Governor Pataki, is also unreasonable and unlikely to provide successful
reform. If the legislature chooses to obtain forty percent of sound basic
education funds from the City, there is likely to be public backlash as well.
Such a requirement, as indicated by the CBC Report, will force the City to
cut back on important programs. 237 It also fails to consider that the City

234. See Anker, supra note 94, at 365. “[T]he public will not support the education of
other people’s children unless it is in their self-interest—it raises economic productivity,
decreases social disorientation and is much less expensive in the long term than the
alternative.” Id.
235. Rebell, supra note 144, at 35.
236. Id.
237. See supra note 187-91 and accompanying text.
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pays substantial funds to the State for programs such as Medicaid.238
Furthermore, a forty-percent local contribution is contrary to the court’s
order, which indicated that the state cannot thwart the implementation of
reform by requiring an arbitrary or unreasonably high contribution from the
City. 239 Ultimately, the State is responsible for providing the sound basic
education, and cannot evade this responsibility by placing a high burden on
the local government. 240 Putting almost half of the education burden on the
locality, rather than with the State, is sure to meet opposition as
unreasonable.
The State has various means for raising revenues to support a fairly large
contribution to a sound basic education. As the CBC Report indicated, the
State can raise the money through a reduction of inefficiencies in the
education system, expanded gambling revenues, and improved enforcement
of sales tax and taxes on professional services. 241 Of important note,
however, is the possible public resistance toward the method of raising
revenues for education through gambling. If the State does as promised,
and promotes gambling at vacation-type casinos with responsible
promotion, public concerns can be alleviated.242 Furthermore, the New
York State Lottery, a form of gambling, already contributes a large amount
to education funding, providing a stable base for state aid. 243
The real question, therefore, comes in determining what constitutes a
reasonable contribution.
Through the proposed Future Act, the
collaborative Campaign for Fiscal Equity went a step further by setting out
a formula to calculate local contribution.244 The Future Act also addressed
concerns by promoting continued community engagement to determine the
regional and local needs of school children. 245 Since collaborative efforts
by the Campaign for Fiscal Equity have been successful in defining a
sound basic education, and in defining the skills education should provide,
there is reason to believe that an effort by the CFE to determine a
reasonable share will be appropriate and most likely to lead to successful
implementation. 246 The legislature should strongly consider adopting the

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 11.
See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
See CBC REPORT, supra note 103 at 17-18.
See H. CARL MCCALL, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, THE
NEW YORK LOTTERY ROLE IN FINANCING EDUCATION (1998), available at
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/schools/1998/4-98.htm#raiser (last visited Nov. 8, 2005).
244. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
245. H.R. A8700, §1302(6), 2005 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2005).
246. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
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Future Act, which is based on the recommendations of the CFE, to
implement CFE V.
If CFE V returns to Justice DeGrasse on appeal, the court may be forced
to assign a percentage of contribution by the State and local governments,
thereby fueling the separation of powers debate. 247 Judicial activism of this
extent has in the past been met with significant opposition from the
executive and legislative branches, and the public. 248 Animosity toward
judicial activism slowed implementation of the Abbott mandate in New
Jersey, and halted education reform in West Virginia. 249 Thus, for New
York to determine contribution shares for state and local government that
are reasonable enough to gain widespread support, additional public
engagement is imperative. Such grassroots effort, such as that of the
Campaign for Fiscal Equity, proved successful in implementation of school
finance reform in Kentucky. 250
B.

Increased School Funding Without Increased Accountability is
Not Enough

School finance reformers can also learn many lessons from the
implementation of KERA.251 It is at the implementation stage where
school reforms rise and fall. 252 Therefore, reformers must be aware of the
state and local governments’ goals and the public’s opinion. 253 Barriers
must be addressed rather than ignored, and barriers exist at the policy,
administrative, and practice levels. 254 Under KERA, a comprehensive
approach which takes such factors into account, in addition to increased
funding, helped make it one of the most successful school finance reform
programs in recent history.
To ensure positive change, the legislature must consider how the money
will be spent. Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Future Act is that
it addresses accountability. The importance of accountability is twofold.
First, money alone is unlikely to provide the reaching reform that City
schools need to provide a sound basic education. 255 Second, ensuring
accountability is likely to ease the minds of some supporters of large local

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.

See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., notes 68-79 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-93 and accompanying text.
See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 22.
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contribution, who are concerned with abuse of state funding at the city
level. 256 In addressing the effective use of resources, the comprehensive
sound basic education plan under the Future Act will identify barriers to
implementation on an annual basis through an ongoing public engagement
process. Involving members of the public at all levels would greatly
increase the likelihood of success. The proposed Future Act would require
the public engagement process to determine what the significant barriers
are. Evidence suggests that increasing aid unaccompanied by substantive
reforms will not produce the desired improvement. 257
As the Citizen’s Budget Commission noted in their report on New York
City schools, there are several inefficient areas which, if corrected, could
contribute significantly to providing a sound basic education for students
both financially and academically. 258 Furthermore, contractual provisions
prevent administrators and principals from using increased numbers of
teachers to reduce class size and improve education. 259 As seen in
Kentucky, great funding gains can be offset by a lack of change in
efficiency and allocation, something New York needs to take into
consideration in implementing the CFE V mandated reform. 260
Therefore, the State must first use community dialogue and open
collaborative efforts such as those initiated by the CFE to define a
reasonable percentage of City contribution for sound basic education that
the public and government can both support. In addressing public and
administrative barriers to implementation, the State should be mindful of
the concerns of both urban and suburban residents.
CONCLUSION
The State is in a position to raise the funds, and has a responsibility to its
citizens to provide a sound basic education. It cannot simply place this
burden on a locality such as New York City and claim that it should bear
nearly half of the cost. The legislature must be reasonable in its allocation
of education funding both from the State and local governments. As earlier
rounds of CFE V have shown, community dialogue and collaboration
between suburban and urban residents can help bring about change for
children throughout New York.
Governor Pataki has stated that he wishes to appeal the decision in

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 22.
See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
See CBC REPORT, supra note 103, at 29-30.
See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.

SCHERERCHRISTENSEN

2005

2/3/2011 10:07 PM

SOUND BASIC EDUCATION

133

opposition to several Congressmen and members of the public. Additional
appeals will only slow judicial efficiency, create costs for all parties, and
create a barrier for learning in New York City. The next step in the CFE
process is not in the courtroom, but in the public arena, ensuring that
children across New York City are given the chance to succeed, beginning
with a sound basic education.

